Isabella Weber

October 2021

WORKINGPAPER SERIES
Number 550

POLITICAL ECONOMY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE

The (Im-)Possibility of Rational Socialism:
Mises in China’s Market Reform Debate

1

The (Im-)Possibility of Rational Socialism:
Mises in China’s Market Reform Debate*
Isabella M. Weber, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract
Investigate the long first decade of reform in China (1978-1992) to show that Mises, in
particular his initiating contribution to the Socialist Calculation Debate, became relevant to the
reconfiguration of China’s political economy when the reformers gave up on the late Maoist
primacy of continuous revolution and adhered instead to an imperative of development and
catching up. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao had rejected the notions of efficiency and
rational economic management. In the late 1970s, the reformers under Deng Xiaoping’s
leadership elevated these notions to highest principle. As a result, Mises’ critique that socialism
could not achieve a rational economic order came to be debated throughout the 1980s and
Chinese economists developed their own reading of Mises and the Socialist Calculation Debate.
When Deng Xiaoping reinstated market reforms in the early 1990s after the Tiananmen
crackdown, a history of thought review of the possibility of rational socialism and socialist
markets helped to justify the Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics the official
designation of China’s economic system to this day.
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Introduction
This essay traces the role of Ludwig Mises’ claim of the impossibility of rational socialism
in China’s path-defining market reform debate (1978-1992). China’s move from revolution to
reform gave rise to a surge in interest in foreign economics as shown in a number of recent
publications.1 But little is known about Chinese economists’ engagement with the Austrian school
1
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in general and Mises in particular at this critical juncture. This essay explores how the Austrian
critique of socialist economics was mobilized by radical Chinese reform economists to reinterpret
the meaning and content of Chinese socialism culminating in the official designation of the new
economic system as Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics in 1992.
At the dawn of reform in the late 1970s, Ludwig von Mises’ economics was by no means
new to China. Mises’ contributions had been ‘imported’, discussed and critiqued in China at least
since the 1930s. During the time of the Great Depression China was deeply integrated into the
global capitalist economy and Chinese economists were intellectually and sociologically
connected to global currents of thought. Chinese students pursued graduate studies in economics
in Japan, Europe and the US, some of them under Friedrich Hayek’s supervision at the London
School of Economics (e.g. Zhou Dewei, Jiang Shuojie and Wu Yuanli).2 Foreign economists such
as Augusta Wagner teaching in China compiled textbooks to introduce Western economics,
including Mises’ and Hayek’s critique of socialism.3 Wang Yanang, famous as cotranslator of
David Ricardo, Adam Smith and Karl Marx trained in Japan and an outspoken critique of Austrian
economics at the time, goes as far as to attest that in the 1930s and early 1940s China was
undergoing a “wholesale importation … of political economy as a discipline and science” which
resulted in a mechanical application of economics principles to China. Wang found that Austrian
school idealism and metaphysics was a key element of this importation.4
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Rebecca Karl’s reading of Wang resonates with Chinese reform economists’ engagement
with Mises half a century later. Seeing China’s reality through the lens of Austrian economics only
left two options, argued Wang: either Austrian economic theory was faulty in China’s context and
China required instead empiricist exceptionalism; or Chinese realty was at fault for not complying
with the Austrian metaphysical universalism and required changing. The earlier conclusion led to
reducing economics to the positivist scientific method. The latter reinforced a wide-spread
sentiment among Chinese economists that stressed feudalism over imperialism and argued for the
need of capitalism and the market as a progressive force.5 Followers of Mises and Hayek found
the Nationalists’ collectivism as unfit to free China from its feudalist backwardness and called for
free enterprise instead.6
Many of China’s prominent promoters of Austrian economics of the 1930s and 1940s fled
to Taiwan where they pioneered the translation of Mises, Hayek, Röpke and others and lobbied
for neoliberal economic policies.7 In contrast, after the Communist revolution in 1949 Austrian
economics largely vanished in the People’s Republic except for a short revival from the viewpoint
of critique in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The disaster of the Great Leap Forward and the
catastrophe of the Great Famine posed again the question of the right economic system and the
role of the law of value under socialism in China’s young People’s Republic. In this context,
Soviet-trained Sun Yefang pioneered the demand for socialist markets inspired by Oscar Lange
and the Socialist Calculation Debate.8 In 1962 Teng Weizao translated Hayek’s (1944) The Road
to Serfdom.9 Teng assures that the purpose of this translation was criticism.10 Yet, given the failure
of the great push for collectivization that was becoming apparent at the time, Hayek’s critique of
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collectivism must have resonated with some of Teng’s readers. As this essay shows, some 20 years
later, this Austrian critique and Mises’ claim of the impossibility of a rational socialist economy
was embraced by some prominent Chinese reform economists and political leaders. It came to play
a role in the redefinition of China’s economic model in the 1980s and early 1990s.
I draw on Chinese articles published on Mises in the period 1978-1992 to show that Mises,
in particular his initiating contribution to the Socialist Calculation Debate,11 became relevant to
the reconfiguration of China’s political economy when the reformers gave up on the late Maoist
primacy of the revolution of the relations of production and adhered instead to an imperative of
the development of the forces of production and catching up.12 During the Cultural Revolution,
Mao had rejected the notions of efficiency and rational economic management. In the late 1970s,
the reformers under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership elevated these notions to highest principle. As a
result, Mises’ (1920) critique that socialism could not achieve a rational economic order came to
be debated throughout the 1980s and Chinese economists developed their own reading of Mises
and the Socialist Calculation Debate. When market reforms were reinstated in the 1990s after
having been stalled since the Tiananmen crackdown, a history of thought review of the possibility
of rational socialism and socialist markets by Jiang Chunze helped to justify the Socialist Market
Economy with Chinese Characteristics as the new official designation of China’s economic system
and target for reform.

From Continuous Revolution to Economic Determinism: How Mises Became
Relevant to China’s Reform
The communist dreamland of liberated individuals and universal solidarity cracked in the
People’s Republic when the regime alienated itself from the population by allowing
bureaucratic privileges on the one hand and excessive persecution of opponents on the
other. But it was not until the revolution’s emancipatory promises were broken in a
‘feudal tyranny’ toward the end of the Cultural Revolution that many believed that much
of the original communist strength had been destroyed. The exhaustion was so evident
that the power transition after Mao died in September 1976 would be initiated by a
‘coup’ to remove his widow, Jiang Qing, and her allies, an event that had been waited for
and was celebrated in the streets. The breakthrough, no doubt a case of political secrecy
11
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and Byzantine politics, nevertheless brought to the fore a broad consensus on the need of
the country to open up, liberalize, and democratize.13
Lin Chun’s synthesis of the critical moment in the 1970s when China shifted from late
Maoism to reform helps us to understand how Mises became relevant to China’s reconfiguration
of the political economy. It was this breaking down of the hope for a “communist dreamland”, the
collapse of the “revolution’s emancipatory promises” and the exhaustion of the “original
communist strength” that gave way to a reorientation from Mao’s emphasis on ‘continuous
revolution’ to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘reform and opening up’. Per capita grain output as a measure both
of nutrition standards and leeway for industrialization had stagnated14 and when many Chinese
officials joined delegations to tour the world under Mao’s designated heir Hua Guofeng, they
found how far China’s material development lacked behind.15 This sentiment combined with the
lost hope in the revolution’s promises laid the ground for China’s reorientation towards a primacy
of economic development and efficiency. Only when China gave up on achieving revolution in
the present and instead pursued a rationalization of its economy did Mises’ claim of the
impossibility of a rational socialist economy become pertinent to China’s economics discourse.
A shift to a more orthodox version of historical materialism prepared the return of Mises
and the Socialist Calculation Debate to China. The paradigm of reform turned Mao upside down.
Mao had rejected Lenin’s claim that the “transition from capitalism to socialism will be more
difficult for a country the more backward it is.” Against this Mao stated: “Actually, the transition
is less difficult the more backward an economy is.”16 The doctrine of reform returned to the logic
of Lenin’s dictum: In the words of the leading party intellectual Su Shaozhi the “less developed
the country, the more difficult the transition from capitalism to socialism.”17 It follows from this
that economic development is essential for the transition to socialism. The immanent ideological
shift of the first years of reform encompassed a rejection of the Cultural Revolution line that saw
the main task to achieve socialism in revolutionizing the relations of production. Achieving higher
13
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levels of development of the relations of production, would in turn lead to a progress of the forces
of production. The shift from revolution to reform meant that this causality was reversed. Now all
emphasis was on developing the forces of production. As a result of this logic of economic
determinism, the relations of production no longer needed to be revolutionized in their own right.
Instead, they had to be redesigned to best advance the forces of production which was in turn
argued to be the most effective way to move towards socialism.18
In these first years of reform, Mao’s theories of class struggle under socialism and of
continuous revolution, his impatience and overestimation of man’s will were singled out as gravely
mistaken, utopian and unscientific.19 This assessment was codified in the official 1981 ‘Resolution
on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People’s Republic of
China’.20 Jing Rongben, in an early contribution on the Socialist Calculation Debate in China’s
leading economics journal, Economic Research (经济研究),

21

implicitly shows that the

fundamental ideological reorientation of the Resolution laid the ground for Mises’ relevance to
China’s reforms. He argues it was undeniable that contradictions emerged in the Soviet-inspired
economic model of public ownership, central planning and distribution according to labor.
According to Rong, there were two interpretations of the emergence of such contradictions. The
first stresses that the relations and forces of production are co-developing and sees contradictions
as result of remnants of capitalism and bourgeois thought in socialist society. This would long
have been the Soviet perspective. The second view admits the possibility of a contradiction
between Soviet-style relations of production and the development of the forces of production and
argues for a plurality of socialist economic systems which reflect different historical conditions.
Rong stresses that this second view was sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party in the 1981
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Resolution. This interpretation would necessitate comparative economic systems research to adjust
China’s economic model to its stage of historical development. The study of comparative
economic systems, in Rong’s eyes, was importantly shaped by the Socialist Calculation Debate
that began with Mises’ (1920) contribution. Against Mises’ claim that a rational socialist economy
was impossible since central planners could not correctly calculate all prices in the economy which
left them without a reliable standard of value, Lange had posited the possibility of using the market
mechanism to serve central planning. Thereby, stresses Rong, Lange used bourgeois economics.
It follows that in China’s search for a new economic model bourgeois economics constitutes a
useful tool.
Rong’s emphasis on the usefulness of bourgeois economics is representative of the general
rehabilitation of economics in the era of reform. During the Cultural Revolution, a study of the
forces of production independent of the relations of production was considered a bourgeois
aberration. Economics as a discipline was largely dismissed and many economists spend years in
the countryside undergoing ‘reeducation’ through labor or like Gu Zhun were sent to prison.22
With the new primacy of economic development in the late 1970s economists and their discipline
were rehabilitated. 23 Catching up through reform meant “making up lessons” in bourgeois
economics which had previously been condemned as “capitalist poison”. China embarked on a
path of learning from foreign economists which involved rapidly growing exchanges.24
As the relations of production were reconceptualized under reform as tools serving the
larger goal of growth and development, the question of whether the market could serve socialism
rose to the top of the agenda as early as 1979. For example, at the famous Wuxi conference that
year two economists of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, Zhao Renwei and Liu Guoguang,
argued for the need of markets. According to them, in the past, the socialist countries had treated
“economic planning and the market … as being mutually exclusive, as if there were no place for
the market in a planned economy” but “such a view” had “brought a series of disasters” to China’s
economy. Without making any references to the protagonists of the Socialist Calculation Debate,
they suggested instead to promote free competition and the regulation of prices by supply and
22
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demand within a certain range, such as for the market mechanism to become the main means in
allocating manpower, materials and funds.25 Deng Xiaoping sanctioned this view some months
later when he told a foreign journalist:
It is wrong to maintain that a market economy exists only in capitalist society and that
there is only [a] ‘capitalist’ market economy. Why can’t we develop a market economy
under socialism? Developing a market economy does not mean practising capitalism.
While maintaining a planned economy as the mainstay of our economic system, we are
also introducing a market economy. But it is a socialist market economy.26
It was to take another 13 years of intense political struggle and debate until the Socialist
Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics was to become officially the designation of China’s
economic model. But once the question of China’s political economy had been reframed in terms
of the most efficient allocation of resources and the most effective advancement of the forces of
production, the question how the market could serve as a tool towards this end under socialism
became centerstage in debates among Chinese economists. This prompted exchanges with Eastern
European (former) market socialists such as Włodzimierz Brus, Ota Šik and later Janos Kornai in
parts facilitated by the World Bank.27 It also gave rise to a fierce debate among reform economists
who emphasized that China’s reform path had to be carved out through experimentation on the
ground improving the material conditions one step at a time, and more academic economists who
sought to define a blueprint for reform in theory to be implemented in one big package.28 Such a
package would have importantly involved overnight price liberalization which is a key component
of shock therapy as it was later implemented in other socialist countries. The economists in search
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of a blueprint became invested in the subdiscipline of comparative economic systems and some
studied the historical Socialist Calculation Debate. In this context, Mises (1920) considered as the
initiator of the Socialist Calculation Debate was frequently acknowledged as an important
contributor to comparative economic systems. Mises entered China’s reform debate as the
economist who had posed the crucial question of whether a rational socialist economy was possible
at a time when Chinese leaders had declared such a rationalization as a foremost goal.29

Rethinking the Market and Socialism: Chinese Economists’ Interpretation of
Mises
The first stage of China’s reform was marked by the fast pace of the rural reforms. In 1984,
the reform of the industrial-urban economy was officially sanctioned when the “Resolution on the
Reform of the Economy System” （中共中央关于经济体制改革的决定）was approved by the
Central Committee. This constituted a formal commitment by the CPC to reform China’s basic
economic model.30 The Resolution declared that socialism and a commodity economy were not
mutually exclusive. The reformers distanced themselves from what was labeled the ‘traditional
view’ that socialism should supersede commodity relations and structure relations of production
around use not exchange values. From now on China’s planned economy should use the law of
value, that is to say socialist production units should be turned into independent commodity
producers taking their production decisions based on exchange values. The development of such
a commodity-producing economy was declared a prerequisite for China’s modernization. Yet,
China’s commodity economy should take a socialist form by being planned and adhering to public
ownership.31
The 1984 Resolution was a broad-brush statement of the direction of China’s reform.
Clearly, it officially sanctioned a wide-ranging use of markets and the price mechanism. But the
precise constitution of China’s planned commodity economy, especially the relation between

29
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planning and market remained open.32 Extending the dual-price system to the core of the urbanindustrial economy and the introduction of a new tax system that made enterprises responsible for
their own profits and losses were important new policies implemented that year. Numerous and
diverse experiments evaluated by practically minded economists contributed to working out a new
economic model in practice. At the same time, the Resolution gave impetus to a surge in theoretical
studies discussing the history of thought on socialist economic models, often conducted by
economists calling for the need of a coordinated market reform package.33
In this context, a wave of papers re-evaluated Mises (1920) and the Socialist Calculation
Debate34 building on earlier contributions focused on Mises’ socialist adversary Oskar Lange35
and Milton Friedman’s interpretation of the Socialist Calculation Debate in his speeches in
China.36 This becomes apparent when surging for Mises (米塞斯), Lange （兰格）and economic
calculation (经济计算) in China’s most important scientific database China National Knowledge
Infrastructure (CNKI). We can observe a general pattern with some variations in these
contributions. They broadly agree that Mises’ question of the possibility of a rational socialist
economy poses an important and productive challenge to the attempt at developing socialist reform
models. Yet, in the 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese economists rejected Mises’ answer that only a
private property, free market type economy could achieve a rational economic order but accepted
32
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his framing of the problem. They also tend to see Lange as too idealist and his model as unrealistic,
but adopt his emphasis on the possibility of markets under socialism. The reviews of Mises and
the Socialist Calculation Debate serve to call for a need to employ the tools of comparative
economic systems research to develop a blueprint for China’s new economic model. This
constitutes a form of Hegelian “Aufhebung” where Mises’ answer to his question of the possibility
of rational socialism is initially rejected, yet his framing of the problem of a rational economy is
retained thus pathing the way for making China’s economic discourse commensurable with
Austrian economics. 37 Let me elaborate my reading of the Chinese reform economists’
interpretation of Mises based on some salient examples.
The first Chinese translation of Mises (1935 [1920]) “Economic Calculation in the Socialist
Commonwealth” (社会主义制度下的经济计算) appeared in 1986 in Comparative Social and
Economic Systems (经济社会体制比较).38 This new journal had just been founded in 1985 in
response to the 1984 Resolution.39 Driving forces and leading editors of the journal have been
Zhao Renwei, author of the 1979 paper on market and plan mentioned earlier and prominent reform
economists, Wu Jinglian, a reform economist in China often dubbed as “Market Wu” due to his
free market radicalism, and Rong Jingben, trained in Russian studies and a scholar of comparative
economic systems based at the Marxism Research Institute of the Compilation and Translation
Bureau of the Central Committee. Wu and Rong had previously collaborated in an attempt to
publish transcriptions of speeches by Brus and Šik during their visits to China in 1979-80 and 1981
respectively. However, the publication of the market reform proposals by these two Eastern
European émigré economists was censored.40 The 1984 Resolution created a political opening that
allowed for a new push towards comparative economics meant to path the way for a radical price,
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tax and wage reform program launched but not implemented in 1986. 41 This initiative was
supported by translations of foreign language texts on the relation between market and socialism,
including Mises (1920).
The editor’s note introducing the translation of Mises (1920) set the tone for subsequent
interpretations of the text and its implicit or explicit relevance to China. First, the editor stresses
that Mises wrote his article as a critique of the planning practice under Soviet war communism.
Thus, argues the editor, when Mises says socialism what he really refers to is Soviet war
communism. By the mid-1980s China had largely broken with the Soviet planning model. It
becomes implicitly clear that Mises’ analysis is only relevant to China as regards the question he
raises on the (im-)possibility of rational socialism not the negative answer he provides. The Peking
University economics professor and popularizer of marginalist economics, Yan Zhijie, made this
point clear in his later analysis of Mises (1920). Yan urges that instead of dismissing Mises as a
capitalist apologist, China’s reformers had to realize that his criticism concerned the traditional
Soviet model and that Mises had anticipated some of the deficiencies that had prompted China to
reform the old system.42
The editor of Mises’ (1920) translation pointed out, Mises had shown that with the
abolishment of commodities and money under socialism it became impossible to conduct rational
calculation and thus to use planning as an efficient economic mechanism. The editor rejects Mises’
stance that private ownership was a necessary condition for the market mechanism and thus for a
rational economy as too extreme. Yet, Mises’ question, according to the editor, had not only given
rise to the Socialist Calculation Debate of the 1920s and 1930s but was worth pondering in the
context of China’s reform. In the 1984 Resolution the use of money-commodity relations under
Chinese socialism had been resurrected. The editor suggests that Mises’ contribution would be
useful in rethinking the relation between the market and public ownership in this context. Thus,
while Mises’ dismissive stance on the possibility of markets under public ownership was
questioned, the claim of the need for a rational economic mechanism and efficient resource
allocation was accepted as relevant to the design of China’s reform.
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In a longer commentary on Mises (1920) published with the Chinese translation, Rong
Jingben further elaborates the editor’s take – which might well have also been written by him.43
Confirming the Austrian market universalism, Rong asserts that all socialist countries undergoing
reform would now agree on the necessity of markets. According to Rong, markets were needed
not only for consumer goods and labor as in the Lange model 44 but also for the means of
production and finance. Replicating Mises’ (1920) arguments, Rong elaborates that as long as the
means of production were not evaluated on the market, there was no way for prices to be rational.
Implying a strong anti-egalitarian message, Rong continues that given the heterogeneity of
different types of labor, it was equally impossible for labor input to be correctly valuated without
market competition. Finally, as long as banks were all part of one big state-owned system treating
all enterprises equally, investments could not be following rational standards of efficiency and
consumer demand. So, finance, too, had to be regulated by the market.45
Having established the necessity for complete markets in full agreement with Mises, Rong
turns to the question of ownership. He suggests that a discussion based on Mises’ contribution was
needed not only on whether markets are compatible with socialist public ownership but also on
whether there might be superior markets without public ownership. Rong asseverates that China
must stick to socialist public ownership but hastens to add that this cannot mean pure public
ownership. In reality, China would already practice mixed ownership forms including individual
and private enterprise as well as foreign capitalist investment. Rong ends his comment on the note
that ultimately the essence of public ownership was to facilitate the accumulation of wealth in
society whereas the purpose of socialist reform was to build a more efficient economic system.
This is very much in line with the Dengist dictum of the time that “poverty is not socialism” and
that “the fundamental task of socialism is to develop productivity” (Fewsmith 1995, 207). In
Rong’s Austrian inspired interpretation, socialism is reduced to a tool for economic growth and all
egalitarian ambitions and communist visions of a life without alienation are discarded. In sum,
Rong has stretched his endorsement of Mises to the maximum attainable degree in a journal
published by the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau under the political circumstances at
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the time. The only remaining difference between Rong and Mises, is Rong’s stress on mixed rather
than pure private ownership.
Rong might have been the most sympathetic interpreter of Mises at the time. For example
Jiang Chunze in an article co-authored with Zhang Yuyan presents a more cautious or subtle
interpretation. 46 Jiang, a prominent scholar of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had just
returned from being a visiting scholar at the University of Illinois, the University of Berkeley and
the Woodrow Wilson International Center where she would have encountered the research frontier
in economics and comparative economic systems. Jiang and Zhang couch their analysis of Mises
in a broad call for the use of the tools of comparative economic systems in China’s economic
system reform debate. Their article provides what was likely to be the most comprehensive history
of thought account of the socialist calculation debate in Chinese to that date covering Pareto,
Barone, Taylor, Hayek and Robbins, and Lange. Against the background of the larger debate, they
criticize Mises for suggesting that there is only one possible form of socialism modeled on the
Soviet war communism. In contrast, the experience of socialism over half a century, they argue,
had demonstrated that in reality there is a plurality of models with multiple arrangements of public
property. Yet, they emphasize the importance of Mises’ framing of the problem: his insight that
economic calculation was necessary for rational resource allocation has proved to be profound and
should guide China’s reform. In order to develop its own efficient system, China should employ
the tools of comparative economic systems and move away from the old way of focusing on “isms”,
i.e. capitalism versus socialism. For Jiang and Zhang and China’s proponent of comparative
economic systems more broadly, Mises serves to reframe the question of the reconstitution of
China’s political economy as a technical problem to be solved with the modern tools of marginalist
economics rather than the reading of classics in Maoism-Marxism-Leninism or fieldwork
evaluating policy experiments.
While Mises is predominantly considered by Chinese reform economists for his
contribution to the socialist calculation debate, some first contributions also appear in the second
half of the 1980s on his larger body of work. For example, Guo Xibao of the Wuhan economics
department surveyed Mises’ theories of money and the business cycle, his anti-Keynesianism and
his study of human behavior.47 Guo stresses Mises’ influence in the West in light of the decline of
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Keynesianism and the new rise of liberalism but comes to the conclusion that Chinese economists
don’t have much to learn from Mises. Another example is the Chinese translation of a Japanese
article titled “Is Free Science Possible?” that introduced discussions on the methodological and
epistemological foundations of Mises’ work including the notions of praxeology and introspection
and his rejection of positivism.48 But clearly, the greatest interest aroused Mises’ work on the
impossibility of rational socialism.
Most Chinese commentators dismissed Lange’s model as too idealist and thus not useful
for China’s purposes of reform. Yet, the evaluation of Mises’ contribution by most Chinese
economists is in agreement with that of Lange. Xiao Xin quotes Lange to this end:49
Socialists have certainly good reason to be grateful to Professor Mises, the great advocatus
diaboli of their cause. For it was his powerful challenge that forced the socialists to
recognise the importance of an adequate system of economic accounting to guide the
allocation of resources in a socialist economy.50
By accepting Mises’ framing of the problem of socialist economic systems, an influential
fraction of Chinese reform economists made China’s market reform debate commensurable with
Western mainstream economics and the global neoliberal economic hegemony. Market socialists
like Lange and his successors like Brus and Kornai thereby served as a bridge, consciously
introduced to China by the World Bank for precisely this purpose.51

Paving the Way for the Socialist Market Economy with Chinese
Characteristics
In 1986 and again in 1988 initiatives launched first by Zhao Ziyang and then by Deng
Xiaoping to liberalize the prices of essential means of production and labor combined with far-
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reaching tax and financial reform failed. 52 If successful, these reform pushes would have
constituted a big policy step towards the Mises-inspired vision articulated by Rong. Despite the
failure of these major policy initiatives, in 1987 a renewed ideological re-articulation of the nature
of Chinese socialism moved Chinese reform ideology further in Mises’ direction. At the Thirteenth
National Congress of the CPC party general secretary Zhao Ziyang officially announced that China
was in the primary stage of socialism. This concept had initially been rejected by the reform leaders
as heresy when articulated by Su Shaozhi and Feng Lanrui.53 In 1987, declaring China to be in the
primary stage of socialism meant that China’s so-called economic backwardness served as
justification to further lift constraints on private ownership and the market. On this basis, Zhao
Ziyang promoted dropping “planned” in the designation of China’s economy and to move to a
socialist commodity economy without further qualifications.54 Around that time and in the context
of this renewed thrust towards more comprehensive marketisation, Murray Rothbard claims: “The
Mises Institute...where I'm vice president, got a message from the Chinese Embassy in Washington
DC that they wanted all the works of Ludwig von Mises, they want to figure out how to
desocialize.”55 But the collapse of first price and then social stability in 1988 and the political
upheaval of 1989 led market reforms to grind to a halt.
In 1990, market reformers faced with the challenge to relaunch their agenda mobilized
interpretations of Mises and the Socialist Calculation Debate. The newly appointed director of the
State Commission for Economic System Reform, Chen Jinhua, was a convinced advocate of the
need for the market to liberate and develop China’s productive forces.56 Chen required a theoretical
analysis to justify his political agenda. He asked Jiang Chunze, then deputy head of the Economic
System Division of his commission to compile a review of the international debate and experience
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of the relation between plan and market.57 Drawing on her earlier work, Jiang now revisited her
evaluation of the Socialist Calculation Debate to argue that both the market and planning were
neutral means of resource allocation. As such they could not be the defining feature of socialism
or capitalism. Further, 20th century history, according to Jiang, had shown that market economies
were superior in enhancing productive forces. Thus, since a planned economy was not a
requirement for socialism, China was best advised to transform its economic system from a
planned to a market economy.
Jiang recapitulates Mises argument that rational prices constitute a necessary condition for
an efficient economy and could only be achieved by the market. In contrast to Lange, who saw the
market as a trial and error mechanism to serve the plan, Jiang argued for a full-fledged market
economy as the basic means of resource allocation. She pushes Lange’s idea of market socialism
to a new level. If socialism can use the market to aid planning, it can also use it as fundamental
economic mechanism. This would not prevent China from also using macroeconomic planning,
Jiang insists. Keynesians and Neoliberals – in Jiang’s view – had come to agree that the modern
market economy is not a pure laissez faire economy and that some extent of intervention was
required. Hence, there was no reason that China could not also combine a market economy with
macroeconomic planning and that this would be socialist by virtue of liberating China’s forces of
production.58
Chen was impressed with Jiang’s succinct argument in line with his marketisation agenda
and shared her report with Jiang Zemin who had replaced Zhao Ziyang as General Secretary of the
CPC in 1989, Premier Li Peng, and Deng Xiaoping who all endorsed the review and added it to
the reference material for the upcoming Seventh Plenary Session of the 13th Party Central
Committee. On the eve of this important Plenum, Deng Xiaoping called a meeting with party
leaders and basically endorsed the message of Jiang Chunze’s report. Deng is quote to have said:
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We must get clear theoretically that the difference between capitalism and socialism does
not lie in planning or market” and may “not think that we are following the capitalist road
for developing a market economy. ... Both planning and market are needed. If we do not
have a market, we cannot get information from the world and that would be to resign
ourselves to a backward status… .59
Deng failed to gain the Central Committee’s support for his line at this time (Vogel 2011,
667-8). Several new articles delivering interpretations of Mises and the Socialist Calculation
Debate in ways compatible with Jiang Chunze’s report appeared in 1990-1992. 60 When Deng
launched his Southern Tour in 1992, preparing the return to his vision of market reform, he
reiterated his earlier statement echoing Jiang’s report.61 In October 1992, the 14th CPC National
Congress took the formal decision to establish a Socialist Market Economy with Chinese
Characteristics. Jiang Zemin explained this new leading concept. His words once more resonated
with Jiang Chunze’s and others’ ‘anything goes’ solution to Mises’ framing of the problem of
rational socialism:
Whether the emphasis was on planning or on market regulation was not the essential
distinction between socialism and capitalism. This brilliant thesis has helped free us from
the restrictive notion that the planned economy and the market economy belong to basically
different social systems, thus bringing about a great breakthrough in our understanding of
the relation between planning and market regulation.62
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The Fourteenth Congress also further eroded the primacy of public ownership and stressed
the need for diverse ownership forms and equal competition between state and non-state
competition thereby legitimizing foreign and private ownership.63 To be sure, the CPC maintained
its ultimate primacy in all affairs, including the economy, and its own logic of economic
governance distinct from the global neoliberal mainstream.64 But by the early 1990s, China had
come a long way from Mao’s agenda of continuous revolution in the direction of Mises’ emphasis
on rational allocation and the superiority of the market economy.

Conclusion
A large wave of scholarly interest in Mises’ whole body of work and Austrian economics
swept China in the late 1990s. This by far outsized the early reform era engagement with Mises I
have analyzed in this essay. Neoliberal thinking gained wide-spread traction when privatization
had moved to the top of China’s policy agenda and the Chinese government negotiated accession
to the World Trade Organization. Rather than focusing on this big tide that has received some
recent scholarly attention,65 this essay analyzes how in the first long decade of reform and opening
up the intellectual and ideological foundation of China’s economic system was reconstituted in
ways that made China’s economics discourse commensurable with the global mainstream.
In the 1930s, Wang Yanang diagnosed that there were only two possible results when
applying Austrian economics to China’s reality: positivist exceptionalism and metaphysical
universalism. The genealogy of the Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics in this
essay leads us to read China’s market reforms as an attempt to reconcile precisely these two
tendencies. On the one hand, China’s reformers have subscribed to the universalism of the market
economy as only viable form of rational economic organization and as without alternative in
China’s attempt to escape backwardness. As such, they have fully embraced both Mises’ insistence
on the need for a rational economic mechanism and efficient resource allocation as well as his
claim that this could only be achieved by a market economy. Yet, the reformers stress China’s
exceptionalism and reject Mises’ necessity of universal private property as unfounded idealism
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not compatible with Chinese reality. China’s reformers have made wide-ranging concessions but
ultimately stand firm that China’s socialist ambition and specific historical circumstances require
a plurality of ownership relations with a leading role for public ownership. The tension between
this embrace of market universalism and insistence on Chinese exceptionalism continues to this
day and provides a lens that can help us understand some of the continuing contradictions in
China’s relation with global neoliberalism.

